Generic Advertising without Supply Control: Models and Public Policy Issues by Hayes, Dermot J. & Jensen, Helen H.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
12-1988
Generic Advertising without Supply Control:
Models and Public Policy Issues
Dermot J. Hayes
Iowa State University, dhayes@iastate.edu
Helen H. Jensen
Iowa State University, hhjensen@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Economics Commons, and the Marketing Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hayes, Dermot J. and Jensen, Helen H., "Generic Advertising without Supply Control: Models and Public Policy Issues" (1988).
CARD Working Papers. 69.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/69
Generic Advertising without Supply Control: Models and Public Policy
Issues
Abstract
Both producers and consumers may respond to the use of producer contributions to fund commodity
promotion. The microeconomic foundation is laid for evaluating generic promotion campaigns where
government is involved, supply is uncontrolled, and markets are close to saturation. The recent legislation
enabling beef and pork promotion provides an application for the model.
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Economics | Marketing
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/69
Generic Advertising 
without Supply Control: 
Models and Public Policy Issues 
Dermot J. Hayes and Helen H. Jensen 
Working Paper 88-WP 39 
December 1988 
111 
Contents 
Abstract . . . 
Introduction 
Previous Work. 
A Framework for Evaluation. 
The Model. ........ . 
The Basic Model. . . . 
Evaluating Advertising Impacts 
Own and Cross-Commodity Effects . 
Example Applied to Beef. . . . . . . . . 
Summary and Implications for Policymakers. 
Endnotes . 
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . 
Figure I. 
Figure 2. 
Figure 3. 
Table 1. 
Table 2. 
Figures 
Total Meat Consumption and Expenditures. 
Livestock Supply 
Retail Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tables 
Estimated elasticities for demand model with homogeneity 
and symmetry imposed in the long run and homogeneity 
imposed in the short run . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Constructed supply response elasticities for 1980-86 
v 
I 
3 
5 
6 
7 
11 
13 
18 
21 
29 
31 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
.•. 
v 
Abstract 
Both producers and consumers may respond to the use of producer contributions 
to fund commodity promotion. The microeconomic foundation is laid for evaluating 
generic promotion campaigns where government is involved, supply is uncontrolled, and 
markets are close to saturation. The recent legislation enabling beef and pork 
promotion provides an application for the model. 
Introduction 
Do producer-fu-nded generic promotion schemes increase producer welfare? The 
pork and beef producer groups promote their meat products to increase strength in 
the marketplace and hence to enhance producer welfare. With more than one 
producer group involved, this can happen only if the net impact of all these 
campaigns increases demand for animal proteins. American consumers, however, seem 
to have reached some biological and aesthetic limit on total caloric consumption. The 
government has used its legislative power to enforce compliance in these promotional 
programs. Can this intervention be justified even if one assumes that the government 
is interested only in producer welfare? If these promotions somehow do increase 
prices, will producers respond to these prices by increasing the quantity supplied, 
eliminating any return to advertising? This paper is an attempt to build a framework 
within which these questions can be answered, taking account of producer and 
consumer response, as well as competing products. 
Marketing orders authorized by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
(AMAA), as well as the process for initiating separate legislation for other specific 
agricultural commodities, have enabled national funding of generic advertising since 
1937. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for conducting 
hearings on the need for free-standing legislation and supervising referendums. 
Promotion programs currently authorized under the separate federal statutes include 
wool, cotton, potatoes, eggs, and dairy (Manley and Kenney); national checkoffs were 
approved for beef and pork in 1988. The large sums of money involved (in 1985, more 
than $500 million [Frank]), as well as the involuntary nature of some of the programs 
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(e.g., beef, pork, wool, and dairy), have generated considerable producer and academic 
interest in evaluating the effectiveness of these promotions. 
Promotions funded by producer contributions may increase the cost of the 
commodity through the additional cost of the checkoff and lead to a transfer from 
consumers to producers or to advertising agencies. For example, supply changes and 
their associated adjustment costs will occur in a competitive industry when promotion 
efforts are effective. This case is typical for agricultural commodities (Nerlove and 
Waugh). If the changes are temporary--such as those caused by advertising decay--
there may be a need for continued promotion to maintain demand at new and higher 
levels. If demand cannot be maintained, the industry or public will bear the 
associated costs. This paper examines the microeconomic foundations for this research 
within the context of public policy and makes more explicit the methodological 
requirements for program evaluation. The analysis is applied specifically to an 
illustration of promotion within the livestock sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, a review of past theoretical and 
empirical approaches to analyzing advertising and commodity promotion highlights the 
inconsistencies of previous models and empirical work on government-mandated 
advertising. Next, a framework is established for evaluating advertising and promotion 
programs. This includes a review of the demand and supply issues and an extension 
of the Nerlove and Waugh (N-W) theoretical model for evaluating the profitability of 
advertising and promotion. Derived measures of the effectiveness of promotion 
programs show the importance to evaluation of the responsiveness of supply to price, 
as well as the interactions among meats within a demand system. Finally, the 
implications are discussed in terms of decisions required by policymakers charged with 
oversight responsibility for commodity promotion. 
3 
Previous Work 
Formal theoretical discussion of the effects on demand from advertising began 
with a paper by Kaldor. He discussed how firms could discover optimal advertising 
expenditures and the effects of these expenditures on equilibrium prices. Other 
researchers examined the influence of taste changes on both utility functions and 
indifference contours (Ichimura, Tintner) and the effect of advertising as a change in 
taste (Bassmann). Incorporating changes in taste into the utility-maximizing 
framework followed from Pollak's classic paper published in 1970, where he introduced 
the concepts of dynamic demand and utility functions. This literature is reviewed in 
Phlips (Chapter 7). Green extended the theory to show how the information made 
available by advertisements could change consumer preferences, and Kotowitz and 
Mathewson analyzed the relationship between consumer tastes and the availability of 
information about product characteristics. In addition to this work, the debate 
continues on whether advertising can change tastes (Dixit and Norman, Stigler and 
Becker). 
Empirical evaluations of commodity promotion date to 1961, when Nerlove and 
Waugh published a market model evaluating advertising effects without supply control 
and applied this to a study of the promotional activities related to orange juice. This 
paper has become a classic. Subsequent empirical studies utilized controlled 
experimental design as well as market-based evidence. For example, in the early 
1960s, a group of USDA researchers (Clement et a!.) ran a controlled experiment to 
evaluate the generic promotion of fluid milk (Forker). The design was similar to that 
used by agronomists to test fertilizer response (i.e., similar market areas received 
different levels of advertising). They concluded that advertising did increase sales. 
In the mid-l960s, research at the University of Florida on the effectiveness of 
promotional campaigns for fresh citrus used econometric techniques to demonstrate 
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that the effect of citrus advertising carried over after a campaign was finished (Lee 
1983 ). These techniques were applied to evaluation of the New York milk promotion 
program in the early 1970s. The research, based at Cornell University, has 
demonstrated a decreasing marginal return to advertising expenditure levels 
(Kinnucan), a complementarity between branded and nonbrand advertisements 
(Kinnucan and Fearon), and the importance of seasonality (Kinnucan and Forker). 
Recently, Liu and Forker have used a transfer function approach to examine returns 
to fluid milk advertisers in New York. 
One noticeable difference between the theoretical and empirical approaches 
mentioned is that, although the theoretical papers provide a basis for incorporating 
and measuring own and cross-commodity advertising effects, the empirical models 
have, to date, used ad hoc single-equation analysis (an exception is Goddard and 
Amuah). There are two aspects of the single-equation approach that make it 
unsuitable for present purposes. First, by ignoring the cross-advertising effects, much 
of this research is useful only for the purposes of the individual industry in question. 
Second, ad hoc single-equation specifications for evaluating advertising effects on 
goods that have close substitutes make it difficult to choose the explanatory variables 
and the functional form for use in estimating the demand equation. Advertising 
effects, if they exist, will be relatively small. In this case, it may be possible to 
provide results that show either a positive or negative impact on the focus variable 
with the appropriate choice of explanatory variables (Leamer). 
For the purposes of evaluating the public sector's role, the cross-advertising 
effects are as important as the own advertising effects. The emphasis on cross-price 
effects and the requirement that these effects be measured in a theoretically sound 
and robust way motivate the use of the demand system approaches developed in the 
theoretical literature and guide the model used in this paper. These methods allow 
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for the imposition of Slutsky symmetry and specify the functional relationships 
between commodities. 
A Framework for Evaluation 
Despite N-W's attention to the supply adjustments in a competitive industry, 
little of the research on commodity promotion takes account of supply adjustments 
(notable exceptions are that of Thompson and Eiler and of Lee 1981 ). However, for 
agricultural commodities facing well-ingrained habits in consumption, the demand 
response to advertisement is likely to be subtle. Although better understanding of 
changing demand structure is essential, analysis of market-level effects and producer 
behavior is required to evaluate the aggregate impacts of generic advertising. 
The example of beef and pork promotion provides a useful way to consider the 
methodological issues related to evaluating promotion in a multicommodity context. 
Although the consumption levels for individual meats have varied substantially, the 
total quantity of meat consumed nationally has been remarkably stable; the presence 
of a slight upward trend may be due to increases in real income. Figure I shows how 
total meat and poultry consumption, as well as per capita meat expenditure deflated 
by the CPI, have varied through time. There seems to be an upper limit to the total 
amount of meat consumers are willing to purchase. This phenomenon has implications 
for the analytical framework. 
In traditional demand analysis, meat expenditures are treated as weak-form, 
separable from other expenditures. This implies that, with overall meat expenditures 
remaining constant, any increase in expenditures for one meat can come only at the 
expense of other meats. Thus, any successful promotional campaign for one meat will 
have cross-commodity effects on the prices and quantity demanded of other meats. 
Should cross-commodity effects be large, they will influence prices and quantity 
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produced in other meat markets, which will influence the equilibrium of the original 
market. 
Successful promotion programs may have offsetting effects on supply. If net 
prices to producers are eventually increased, producers will be free to respond to 
these prices with additional production, although short-run impacts may be negative as 
producers respond to anticipated higher prices in the future by building capacity (e.g., 
herd size). Increases in the marginal costs of production due to (per unit) producer 
assessment will dampen supply. 
The· Model 
Nerlove and Waugh constructed a theoretical model for evaluating the static 
conditions for optimal advertising under competitive conditions (i.e., no supply 
control). The basic finding was that advertising is profitable if (I + e)a/(e - n) is 
greater than 0, where e is the elasticity of industry supply, n is the elasticity of 
demand with respect to price, and a is the marginal gross revenue from increased 
advertising expenditures, with prices held constant. In an extension and critique of 
the N-W results, Bockstael makes explicit a major shortcoming of applying the N-W 
results to promotion in agriculture. By assuming advertising to be financed by a 
single lump-sum assessment, N-W treats assessment as part of other fixed costs, whicli 
do not enter the marginal decisions of the firm. Alternatively, as Bockstael shows, 
assessments made on a per-unit-of -output basis (as is the case with most of the 
funding mechanisms for agricultural commodity promotion) affect the firm's marginal 
cost curve and hence the industry supply. The impact is to shift supply back, limiting 
supply on the market and enhancing the effectiveness of the program. The model 
outlined below is essentially an extension of Bockstael's critique to the case where 
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close substitutes exist and where legislation is used to ensure that funds are available. 
The model is applied to the meat industry, including beef, pork, and poultry. 
The discussion of the model of the meat industry has two parts. In the first 
part, the conditions under which government and the individual producer group 
(industry) should support the promotions are derived. Profitability for an individual 
industry is shown to depend only on changes in the equilibrium quantity sold and on 
the slope of the marginal cost curve. This outcome has important implications for 
data needs and reflects the fact that prices are more volatile and less definable than 
quantity. From the perspective of the three industries considered together by the 
government, the government's evaluation of promotion effectiveness is shown to be 
determined by the impact of the promotion on the price of the product, related 
products, and the government's weighing of revenue to each of the industries. A 
rather surprising implication of this model is that none of the parameters of the 
demand system need to be estimated to evaluate whether or not advertising will be 
profitable for a particular industry. They are necessary when the impacts on the 
industries are considered together. Difficulty in evaluating the second-order 
conditions limits this application (and in the same way, the N-W model [Bockstael]) 
for evaluating the optimal level of advertising. 
In the second part, the model is extended and applied to the evaluation of 
advertising and promotion effects on own and cross prices. Under specific 
assumptions on the nature of advertising and promotion effects, this model allows 
evaluation of the impact of any specified change in one meat price on the prices of 
related products. 
The Basic Model 
The following assumptions have been made: 
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I. There are three competing commodities (beef, pork, poultry). 
2. The beef, pork, and poultry industries are perfectly competitive. 
3. A measure of a successful promotional campaign is that producer profits, 
net of the advertising costs, increase. 
4. The advertising budget is financed by a tax of $r per unit of production. 
5. The market prices for beef, pork, and poultry can be described with a 
single statistic per market. 
6. Industry costs can be represented as the sum of firm fixed costs (Z) plus 
the area under an aggregate marginal cost curve M(Q). 
Following Bockstael's model for a single commodity, the multicommodity profit 
function is 
. . . . . . . . . . . d . . . . . 
1r1 = P1(Q1, Ql, A1, Al) Q1(P1, PJ, A1, Al) - f M1(Q1, r1)dQ1 - Z1 (I) 
0 
where i cf j, and 
1, J represent beef, b; pork, p; and poultry, c; 
,., is profits of industry i; 
ri is the per unit advertising tax in industry i; 
A1 is total advertising expenditures of industry i, such that Ai = Qi,-i; 
pi is market price of meat i; 
Q1 is quantity of meat i sold or purchased; 
M1(Q1) is the inverse supply function of meat i; and 
Z 1 is the fixed production costs. 
The first-order conditions for the optimal checkoff tax for meat i, from the 
perspective of the government, is 
(2) 
where i F j, subscripts denote partial derivatives, and ,J,l is the weight placed by the 
federal government on profits earned by industry i. 
The competitive market assumption allows us to write pi = Mi. Also, note that 
. . 
Q . . Q . 
the per unit checkoff implies that f M1 i dQ1 = f ldQ1. 
0 T 0 
Cancellation of like terms allows us to write the first-order conditions as 
(3) 
Note that if .A1 = l and .AJ = 0, we obtain the first-order solution for an industry 
whose members produce only one meat. That is, P1 i = l. 
T 
However, the second derivative of the profit function with respect to advertising 
expenditures in this multigood case cannot be signed, as shown by Bockstael for the 
case of one good. Thus, equilibrium conditions can be used only to tell producers 
whether or not it pays to have advertising when the producer group starts from a 
position of no advertising. The "optimal" level of advertising thus becomes an 
empirical problem because the second-order conditions depend in part on estimating 
the impact of advertising on the responsiveness of demand to price and to advertising. 
We can, however, define the conditions under which advertising is successful as 
(4) 
The intuition behind this result can be seen by considering some possible values for .A 1 
and .Aj. If ;.i = l and .Aj = 0, the result indicates that an industry should advertise 
only if producers receive a net price increase; i.e., advertising would increase own 
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price by more than the checkoff tax. Note that, in this case, the evaluation is made 
only from the perspective of the single industry. If >.i = >.j (i.e., ,\b = >.P = >.C), 
evaluating ( 4) under this condition implies that the government should support a beef 
checkoff, for example, if 
(5) 
Then (5) implies that when beef advertising acts to reduce pork and poultry prices 
(i.e., pPb, pcb < 0), the conditions for advertising to be successful are that the net 
T T 
increase in the price of beef should be sufficient to offset the weighted losses in the 
pork and poultry industries. 
If the impact of a beef promotion increases the prices of pork and poultry, the 
conditions under which the government should support a checkoff scheme are much 
less onerous. This would occur if the beef promotional campaign portrayed meat as a 
nutritious high-value product. Currently, the pork producers are running a campaign 
that encourages consumers to eat pork, "the other white meat." If effective, this 
campaign is likely to have a negative effect on beef prices and a positive or neutral 
effect on poultry prices. This is because the information contained in the pork 
campaign may reduce the marginal utility of beef. (These effects are discussed later.) 
Under these conditions, the requirements for effective pork advertising are more 
stringent (requiring a greater effect on price) from the public's perspective than from 
the perspective of the industry alone. 
These conditions ignore the welfare of the consumer. Unless advertising 
increases consumer welfare by providing useful product-specific information, these 
promotions are a zero sum game. If all producers are to recoup the costs of 
promotions, they must eventually increase retail prices. An evaluation of the benefits 
to consumers would entail some valuation of the information provided by the 
campaigns; it would also include a measure of the benefit provided via increased media 
II 
revenues, which presumably increase media quality. These issues go beyond the scope 
of this study. 
Evaluatlna Advertlsina Impacts 
Additional information on the influence of the advertising tax on price can be 
obtained by a comparative static analysis of the market equilibrium conditions. 
Let Qi = oi(pi, pj, Ai, Aj), 
Qi = si(pi, ri), 
Ai-ri.Qi. 
Letting QO equal the initial quantity of good i upon which the advertising tax is 
assessed, we can derive the equilibrium price and quantity changes: I 
(6) 
and (7) 
Notice that the response of producers to a price increase si i should be the opposite p 
of their response to a tax increase sii. If we substitute si i for - sii, it is possible to 
f p T 
solve both (6) and (7) for the term 
This gives 
Pi-
T 
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Si. 0 i p'- p' 
S'. Qi p' T 
Sf,i - D'. p' S'. p' 
Qii S1 i -
S'. p' 
D'. 
P1 i T 
p p' 
=> - = T -
Spi Sf,i- D'. p' 
=> P1i = I + 
T 
Si p' 
o'· p' 
- D'· p' 
These are equilibrium conditions for industry i with competing products. 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(II) 
First, note that all cross-product effects have dropped out. Also, remember that 
for an individual industry to find advertising profitable, the sufficient condition was 
. . 
that P1i > I. Hence, producers themselves need only evaluate the signs of Q1i and 
T T 
. . 
Sf,i. The expression Q~i measures how the equilibrium quantity responds to advertising, 
and Sf,i is the price responsiveness of supply. The equilibrium condition for the 
individual industry depends on the supply response within that industry. Sf,i is 
expected to be > 0, although in the short run it may be negative. However, 
profitability of advertising depends on the sign of Qi,i as well. With S~ > 0, if 
Q1i < 0, advertising is not profitable. That is, if an industry's price supply 
T 
responsiveness is positive and if total quantity sold decreases with the campaign, then 
advertising is not profitable for that industry. If Sf, < 0, then advertising would be 
profitable in the short run if Q1 i < 0. 
T 
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For the government to justify its intervention (and account for effects on more 
than one industry), the conditions are more severe. When revenues are equally 
weighted among industries, this requires that 
2 
- E (-'j/>.iJ pji(Qj/Qi) 
j=l T 
(!2) 
Unless the cross-promotional effects on prices are positive, P1i > l is a necessary but 
T 
not sufficient justification for public support of the promotion. 
One very intuitive implication of (ll) is that generic advertising can never be 
profitable if it is carried on for a long period. This is true because Sj,i tends to 
infinity over time. Generic advertisement can at best provide a short-term boost to 
profits. 
Own and Cross-Commodity Effects 
The econometric estimation of the term pJi is made difficult by the number of 
T 
components that must be measured. To see why this is so, consider the particular 
case of how advertising one meat affects the demand curves for other meats. Under 
the assumption that advertising provides information about product attributes, thereby 
changing the utility received from consuming that product, the short-run utility 
function may be specified as 
U = f(Q, S) , ( 13) 
where S is a vector of state variables (i.e., the consumer's stock of information about 
the nutritional qualities of different foods). If we then hypothesize that advertising 
infl.uences this stock of information, an equation of motion can be specified of the 
type 
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S (t) = A(t) - 5iS(t) (14) 
where 
A(t) represents the vector of advertising efforts made in time t, and 
5i is the rate at which consumers forget the information contained within ads. 
Maximization of this short-run utility function for any given stock of 
information, subject to the usual budget constraint, results in a set of Marshallian 
demand equations of the type 
Q = Q(Y, P, S). (15) 
Total differentiation of these equations results in 
dQ = QydY + QpdP + QsdS , (16) 
with I Qs =- ;pKV (17) 
and Qp = K- QyQ'' (18) 
where 
1/1 is the marginal utility of meat expenditures; 
K is the substitution matrix; 
Qy is the vector of the expenditure terms; 
V is the matrix of partial derivatives of the marginal utilities with respect to 
the state variables (a2u;aQiasi); and 
Qp is the matrix of Marshallian demand relationships.2 
If V were known, one could solve (16) for dP/dS and, consequently, for Pi;. 
T 
Where only changes in prices and quantities are known, as in the use of 
aggregate data, an accurate measure of V wiil be impossible. For example, this would 
involve the separating out from a livestock model how consumers' purchases of beef 
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respond to beef, pork, and poultry advertising, as well as the more traditional 
measures such as own and cross-price elasticities and supply responsiveness. The 
number of unknown relationships is greater than the number of observed variables. 3 
In fact, it is not in the interests of any one producer group to measure pJi· It may 
T 
be, however, in the interest of the government to measure this term. 
It is possible to use the general model (e.g., [15]) for three competing products, 
considering the special case for which a promotion campaign exists for one (beef) to 
illustrate cross-commodity effects. For this case, assume that the beef advertisements 
influence only the marginal utility of beef, and that in the short run (one quarter) 
meat and poultry supply and total expenditures are held fixed. 
Holding expenditures and quantity fixed (dQ, dY = 0) by assumption, ( 16) becomes 
QpdP + QsdS = 0 . (19) 
Substituting for Qs from (17) and assuming the marginal utility of meat expenditures, 
¢, is I, ( 19) can be written in matrix form as 
Qbb Qbp Qbc 
Qpb Qpp Qpc 
Qcb Qcp Q~c 
where 
c represents poultry; 
b represents beef; 
p represents pork; and 
= 0 0 0 (20) 
0 0 0 0 
Qij represents the change in demand for good i caused by a change in the price 
of good j. 
Note: (21) 
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Using the Slutsky relationship for (18) and performing the matrix multiplication just 
indicated produces, after some manipulation, 
QbpdPP + QbcdPc = [Kbb Vbb]dSb - [Kbb - Qbeby]dPb, (22) 
QpbdPP + QppdPc = [Kpb Vbb]dSb - [Kpb - QbePy]dPb, (23) 
QcbdPP + QccdPc = [Kcb Vbb]dSb - [Kcb - Qbecy]dPb , (24) 
where e1y is the expenditure elasticity for a particular meat. One measure of V (i.e., 
a2u;aQiasi) would be the change in the consumer's willingness to purchase the same 
quantity of good i at a new price. This is true because in equilibrium the marginal 
utility of a particular item will equal its price. Any change in the marginal utility of 
an item will be reflected by the consumer's willingness to purchase more of that item 
at the same price, or to continue to purchase the same quantity at a different price. 
Assume the special case wherein only the marginal utility of beef is affected by beef 
advertising, and in which short-run meat supply and total expenditures are fixed; one 
corollary of these assumptions is that the advertising-induced change in beef prices 
will, in equilibrium, be equal to the advertising-induced change in the marginal utility 
of beef. This may be expressed as 
dPb = a2u dsb 
aQbasb 
(25) 
where the first term on the right--hand side is the change in marginal utility of beef 
consumption of the average consumer for each incremental change in that consumer's 
information about the product.4 If this relationship did not hold, utility-maximizing 
consumers would not purchase the total quantity of beef supplied. 
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Using relationship (25) for beef (dPb = VbbdSb) yields 
QbpdPP + QbcdPc = Qb,bydPb 
QpbdPP + QppdPc = Qb,PydPb 
QcbdPP + QccdPc = Qb,cydPb 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
These relationships ([26], [27], and [28]) have an intuitive interpretation. Beef 
advertising has increased the marginal utility of beef. With fixed supply, this is 
reflected in an increase in beef price. However, this price increase for beef does not 
increase pork demand via the substitution effect (Kijl· This is true because 
consumers do not perceive a change in the quality-adjusted price of beef; hence, the 
change in beef price is absent from the left-hand side of (26), (27), and (28). 
Consumers do, however, spend more on beef equal to Qbdpb_ Because meat 
expenditure is held constant, this expenditure shock must be compensated for by 
reduced expenditures on pork and poultry. Fixed supplies of pork and poultry imply 
that this is reflected in changes in the prices of the commodities. In other words, 
the prices of pork and poultry must adjust to compensate for the increase in beef 
prices so that the consumer can continue to consume the same bundle. This 
adjustment in pork and poultry prices is felt in proportion to their expenditure 
elasticities and their own price and cross-price elasticities, via (27) and (28). 
For any specified change in beef prices, it is possible to estimate the resulting 
change in pork and poultry prices. This is achieved by specifying (27) and (28) in 
matrix notation and solving for dPp and dPc by using Cramer's Rule to get 
dPP = dPb . Qb . ,Py . Qcc - dPb . Qb . ,cy . Qpc 
Qpp · Qcc - Qpc · Qcp 
(29) 
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and 
dPb . Qb . ,cy . Q _ dPb . Qb ,Py . Q dPc = PP · cp (30) 
Opp · Occ - Ope · Ocp 
Hence, for any arbitrarily specified value for dPb, the resulting change in pP and pC 
can be determined using known relationships. Under the restrictive assumptions of 
fixed quantity and expenditure, and of an advertising impact as specified above, dPP 
and dPc are measures of pii· 
r 
Example Applied to Beef 
To assess the profitability of the generic promotion and advertising program, the 
relevant empirical questions are the impact of generic advertisement on the volume of 
sales (II), the impact of successful advertising in one market on the prices of close 
substitutes (4), and the sign of the price responsiveness of supply. A quarterly model 
of the U.S. livestock sector was used to provide model-based parameters that have 
been estimated econometrically (CARD), although for present purposes it is best to 
treat these variables as synthetic. The model-based parameters reported in Tables 
and 2 were used in two illustrative examples. 
Because consumption changes are likely to be subtle and evaluation of promotion 
programs may require several years of data from controlled market studies, simulations 
based on model-based parameter estimates were used as a means of better 
understanding responses in the livestock sector. Two illustrations show how the 
advertising campaigns can be evaluated. The first evaluates the campaign from the 
perspective of a single industry; the second demonstrates the importance of cross-
price effects, especially with respect to public sector evaluation. 
Illustration I. The first example is an application of (II) to the case in which 
the objective function is that of a single industry. The case is that of a hypothetical 
beef industry campaign with a promotion program in effect for one quarter. This 
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particular simulated campaign has the effect of increasing the price consumers are 
willing to pay for beef by 4.5 percent, or approximately 12 cents per pound. To see 
how the evaluation might be done, compare (II) and (4). From (4) we know that 
advertising is successful if pii is greater than one. Equation (II) shows that this will 
T 
be the case if the ratio Q~i/Sj,i is positive. 
Note first from Table 2, Sj,i for the short run (after one year) is small and 
negative. If we assume that the price responsiveness of supply remains unchanged by 
the campaign, we need only measure Q1 i through the simulation. This may be defined 
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as the advertising-induced changes in the quantity of meat sold. This effect appears 
as the induced quantity changes, illustrated in Figure 2. In the last quarter of the 
campaign (quarter four), beef supplies have decreased because of the promotion (i.e., 
Q1 i < 0). In this case, given the negative short-run supply elasticities, the campaign 
T 
is deemed successful in the fourth quarter. The evaluation during the next year 
depends on the quarter chosen and the supply elasticity used. Clearly, evaluating a 
promotion campaign in the short run is sensitive to the period of observation and the 
short-run effects on supply. 
By going to a longer-term analysis, evaluated at the end of five years, the 
impacts are more clear-cut: Si i > 0 and Qi i > 0. From the perspective of a single p T 
industry, the promotion is successful five years after the start of the promotion 
effort. Although the requirements for immediate evaluation may be important to the 
industry, the illustration highlights the importance of the period for evaluation and, 
perhaps, of a longer-term perspective. 
Illustration 2. An example based on certain assumptions about the nature of the 
beef advertising effect can be used to illustrate cross advertising effects and their 
importance relative to the impacts of promotion within the livestock industry. To see 
how this might be done, consider how a successful beef campaign might influence pork 
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and poultry prices. In the short run, the supply of beef is relatively fixed. An 
outward shift in the demand curve will be reflected in higher beef prices. For policy 
purposes, the unique aspects of meat advertising are the high degree of 
substitutability among meats and the relatively fixed nature of total meat consumption 
or expenditures. The simplified model described above can be used to evaluate the 
success of a campaign. 
By using (29) and (30), the price effects dPP and dpC were evaluated as follows. 
By assumption, a beef campaign in the first quarter of the period increased beef 
prices by 12 cents for every I 0 cents of assessment per pound; that is, P~b = 1.2. 
Meat supplies do not adjust in this first quarter; consequently, the change in pork 
and poultry prices can be determined by (29) and (30). In the second quarter, meat 
supplies were allowed to adjust to the earlier changes; by assumption the effect of 
the first-quarter beef advertising carried over into remaining quarters with a 50 
percent decay rate (S * 0.5 in [14]). Total expenditures were held constant in the 
first quarter. 
By using the specified parameters, the change in pork and poultry prices 
resulting from a 12-cent price impact can be determined by using (29) and (30). 
These calculations were performed by using the short-run demand parameters 
presented in Table I. The resulting first-quarter changes in the prices of pork and 
poultry were -6.4 cents and -2.3 cents, respectively. The base, or convergent, values 
for the period of the simulation were $2.59 per pound for beef, and $1.65 per pound 
and S.79 per pound for pork and poultry, respectively. 
If it is assumed that this 12-cent price change was the result of a 10-cent per 
pound advertising tax, the success of the scheme can be determined from the 
government's perspective. The right-hand side of (5) becomes 
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- 4129 (-6.4)- 3520 (-2.3) 
7079 7079 
= 1 + 3.73 + 1.14 
= 5.87, 
where 7,079 is total U.S. beef production (000 tonnes), 4,129 is total pork production, 
and 3,520 is total chicken production in 1987. Notice that from the perspective of an 
individual industry, the 12-cent increase in price for a 10-cent investment (P~i = 1.2) 
would have been viewed as a successful program. From the government's perspective, 
the net increase in producer welfare was only 6 cents (12 - 5.87 = 6.13) per 10-cent 
tax (assessment), when the three industries were weighted equally; Pbb was not 
f 
greater than the term on the right side. Hence, from the perspective of the livestock 
sector as a whole, the promotion was not successful. The simulated effect of the 
beef campaign on prices of all these meats is shown in Figure 3. The same result 
would have occurred throughout the first year of the campaign. Again, however, this 
figure emphasizes the importance of the time period used when evaluating these 
programs. Selection of other, later time periods may yield different results. 
Theoretically, one could measure any impact of beef promotions on the marginal 
utility of pork consumption. In reality, however, the standard errors for the required. 
elasticities would be large enough to make these calculations meaningless. The 
sensitivity of results to the estimated parameters highlights the importance of 
obtaining econometrically robust estimates of these parameters. 
Summary and Implications for Policymakers 
This paper has developed a relatively straightforward model that can be used to 
evaluate commodity promotion programs where supply response exists (i.e., competitive 
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industries) and cross-commodity effects are incorporated. The analysis has focused on 
evaluating conditions where promotion is profitable for an individual producer group 
and for related industries. Whether or not a promotion is deemed successful depends 
on whether the individual industry or the market sector is considered. Furthermore, 
short-term impacts may be different from those evaluated with a longer-term 
perspective. Indeed, industries that face large adjustment costs should keep in mind 
that campaigns may induce short-run adjustment costs on the industry; in the very 
long run, these can never be profitable with supply adjustments. In an industry with 
relatively free entry and the ability to expand production over time, profitability may 
not be the best measure of "success." It can be affected by promotion only in the 
short run. Other measures such as market share, market stability, or the size of the 
industry are more appropriate for long-run consideration. 
Several implications for commodity producers and policymakers can be 
summarized: 
I. If checkoff -funded promotion schemes are to be worthwhile from the 
viewpoint of an individual industry, the net impact of the checkoff on the 
equilibrium quantity sold must be greater than the responsiveness of supply 
to price. These promotions cannot be a viable long-term option because the 
price responsiveness of supply becomes very large with sufficient time. 
2. Checkoff payments are to be preferred over lump sum payments because of 
their more restrictive effects on output and, therefore, on price. 
3. Government involvement is best directed toward promoting increased 
consumption of meat as a commodity rather than sponsoring promotions to 
increase consumption of one meat by disparaging the quality of others. 
4. From the perspective of an individual industry, promotional campaigns can be 
evaluated by measuring their impact on the quantity of sales. However, from 
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the public sector's perspective, the cross-promotion effect of price in related 
industries is necessary for assessing the impact. There seems to be no 
satisfactory method by which economists can measure this change given the 
data that are currently available. If the government is to justify its 
continued involvement in these matters, it should encourage the advertising 
agencies to place the ads in a manner that allows cross- sectional 
comparisons of various advertising levels in different regions. This would 
allow economists to scientifically measure the impact of these campaigns on 
the equilibrium quantity sold. 
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Figure 2. LIVESTOCK SUPPLY 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
~ 0 
z 
-o.1 ~ 
u 
-Q.2 
.... 
z 
"' -o.3 u
a: 
~ 
-o.4 
-o.5 
-o.s 
-o.7 
-o.a 
-o.s 
-2 -1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 13 14 15 
YEAR 
0 BEEF + PORK 0 CHCKEN 
26 
Figure 3. RET AIL PRICES 
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Table 1. Estimated elasticities for demand model with homogeneity and symmetry imposed in 
the long run and homogeneity imposed in the short run (estimation period 
1967-86) 
Estimated Elasticities Lag 
Adjustment 
Beef Pork Chicken Expenditure Coefficient 
Beef 
Short run -0.52 0.23 -0.14 0.43 0.33 
(0.08)a (0.05) (0.05) (0.20) 
Long run -0.80 0.30 -0.028 1.06 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.30) 
Pork 
Short run 0.42 -0.70 -0.06 0.19 0.25 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) 
Long run 0.62b -0.60 0.13 0.68 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.23) 
Chicken 
Short run 0.06 0.19 -0.63 0.0004 0.17 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.23) 
Long run -0.17b 0.34b -1.05 1.24 
(0.06) (0.27) 
aThe figures within the parentheses indicate standard error. 
bElasticity computed from the imposed symmetry restrictions. 
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Table 2. Constructed supply response elasticities for 1980-86 
Short-Run Elasticities Long-Run Elasticitiesa 
Beef Supply -0.03 0.16 
Pork Supply 0.02 0.50 
Chicken Supply 0.10 b 
aElasticities represent approximate supply elasticities evaluated at 1984-86 mean values 
of exogenous variables and generated through dynamic simulation. The short-run elasticity is 
the change in total supply in the first year. The long-run elasticity was evaluated after each 
model converged to a new equilibrium. 
bThe chicken supply responded fully after one year (CARD). 
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Endnotes 
I. If the campaign is ongoing, Q itself is endogenous, and therefore A is, too. This 
latter situation complicates the model slightly. Successive rounds of advertising 
expenditures result in an infinite series of adjustments that converge to 
C.Q - D A Q/( I - DAr). The intuition behind this term is that the total horizontal 
shift in demand C.Q equals the initial shift D A multiplied by the multiplier effect 
1/(1 - DAr). When Q is allowed to vary, the comparative static results are 
complicated to the extent that all terms containing a partial derivative of the 
demand curve are multiplied by the term 1/(1 -DAr). Despite the inclusion of 
this term, the sufficient conditions for profitable advertising in the model remain 
unchanged (Bockstael). This is also true for the case with more than one 
commodity; hence, the term can be omitted because it complicates the algebra 
without changing the final results or conclusions. 
2. These results are derived in Phlips, pp. 187-89. 
3. The technology does exist that would allow these relationships to be measured; 
however, the data are very expensive and most often are purchased on a per item 
basis. Commercial companies have developed a technology, known as the split 
cable method, that allows for the measurement of the effect of single advertising 
campaigns. This is achieved by altering the television signal received by groups 
of individual households in a particular region and then closely monitoring the 
food purchases of these households to detect whether a particular campaign 
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actually influences household purchases. By exposing these households to only 
one type of promotion and monitoring their purchases of all meats, this cross-
advertising effect could be measured. By assuming that the sample group of 
consumers were representative of the U.S. population, P~i could be calculated. 
4. Strictly, the comparison of marginal utilities requires the further assumption of 
cardinal utility. The measure of change in marginal utilities is made under this 
and the restrictive assumptions that the state-induced changes influence only the 
marginal utility of beef. 
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